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DIXON RANCH COMPANY, et al., 
Appellants. 
Appellant's Brief 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellants are the Dixon Ranch Company and 
certain of the Stockholders who are appealing on behalf 
of themselves and the rest of the stockholders. 
In the District Court the appellants unsuccessfully 
moved to set aside a default judgment entered against 
the corporation. After a contested hearing the District 
Court denied the motion and the appellants appealed. 
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SPECIFICATION OF ERROR 
The appellants contend that the District Court erred 
as follows: 
1. That the District Court abused its discretion in 
not allowing the appellants' motion to vacate the default 
judgment. 
2. In holding that reopening the case would be only 
for the purpose of a cross.:action between certain of the 
defendants. 
The appellants waive the rest of the points raised 
in the designation of points. 
THE FACTS 
The facts as shown on the record of the case are not 
in dispute for the most part. The case was a quiet title 
action initiated in the District Court of Duchesne County 
to quiet title to approximately 1120 acres of valuable oil 
property which constitute the entire assets of the defunct 
Dixon Ranch Company, a corporation originally organ-
ized and authorized to do business within the State of 
Utah, (R. 2, 52). The Dixon Ranch Company forfeited 
its charter for nonpayment of taxes and has not actively 
engaged in business since the year 1934 (R. 52). The 
stock in the company had been owned by six stockholders, 
all of whom were deceased at the time of the filing of the 
action except for Arnold Dixon, (R. 59, 60). Arnold 
Dixon at one time had been a director of the company, 
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and as such he was the sole surviving director, (R.. 59). 
There are now about 20 stockholders as heirs of the 
original stockholders (one of whom is Paul Dixon, an 
appellant), all but two of whom reside in the vicinity of 
Salt Lake and Provo, (R.. 59). On or about the 15th day 
of September, 1950 Arnold Dixon purported by quit-
claim deed to convey all right, title and interest in and 
to said property on behalf of the Dixon R.anch Company 
to the Valley Investment Company, (R.. 60). This was 
done without notice to and without consulting the other 
stockholders. This conveyance is alleged by the appel-
lants to have been obtained fraudulently, and it is also 
contended that Arnold Dixon had no authority to make 
such a conveyance which purported to convey away and 
dissipate the entire assets of the corporation, R.. 68). 
The Valley Investment Company was a party to the 
action in the District Court ( R.. 2). 
At the beginning of the quiet title action concerning 
the subject property, Arnold Dixon, the sole surviving 
director of the corporation, was served with process in-
dividually and as a director and trustee of the Dixon 
Ranch Company (R. 6, 7). At no time were any of the 
stockholders notified by Arnold Dixon of the pending 
suit, (R. 40). As alleged in the affidavit of Paul Dixon, 
the elderly Arnold Dixon had for a long time been a 
seriously ill man, (R. 40). The only notice the stock-
holders had of the pending suit was that by chance they 
discovered publication of summons in a newspaper on 
the 23rd day of August, 1951, the last day of publica-
tion, (R. 27, 40). Immediately they wrote to the County 
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Clerk for a copy of the complaint and contacted attorney 
Phil Hansen to represent their interests and the interests 
of the corporation, (R. 40, 41). An answer and counter-
claim were filed by mail in the District Court on the 
13th day of September, 1951, 21 days after the last date 
of publication of summons ( R. 22). According to the 
affidavit of attorney Hansen, Mr. Colton, attorney for 
the respondent had orally granted him time in which to 
answer, (R. 57). The record further shows that the 
appellants' answer and counterclaim were stricken upon 
motion of the respondent's attorney on the 13th day of 
September, 1951, the very day upon which the answer 
was filed, (R. 29, 32). The appellants had no notice of 
the striking on September 13, or that a default had been 
entered against them on the 11th day of July, (R. 40, 
57). They had no notice of any of the proceedings until 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment 
and decree were mailed to them on the 24th day of 
October, 1951, (R. 33, 37). 
Immediately upon receipt of judgment and decree, 
proceedings were instituted on behalf of the stockholders 
and the Dixon Ranch Company to have the default and 
judgment set aside and vacated in order that they might 
again file an answer to the plaintiff's complaint, (R. 39, 
56, 62). After a contested hearing on the motion to set 
aside the default judgment the District Court denied the 
appellants' rnotion, ( R. 71). 
The defense which the appellants assert against the 
claim of title of the respondents is that the tax titles 
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upon which the respondents rely are void because no 
auditor's affidavit was ever issued and no proper tax 
sale proceeding was had, and that the respondent has 
not been in possession of the land for the statutory 
period, and therefore, could not acquire title by adverse 
use, (R. 41). 
ARGUJ\IENT 
I. THE CouRT ABUSED ITs DiscRETION IN NoT ALLOWING 
THE APPELLANTS' l\I oTION To VACATE THE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 60 (b) U.R.C.P. provides that on terms which 
are just and in furtherance of justice, the Court may 
relieve a party from a final judgment or proceeding on 
the grounds of "excusable neglect". 
While the granting or withholding of relief rests 
largely in the sound discretion of the trial court, this 
court will reverse the lower court if that discretion is 
abused. Each case must be determined on its own facts. 
Rule 60 (b) was patterned after Sec. 104-14-4, U. C. 
A. 1943. This statute has been considered on numerous 
occasions. 
Cutler 1.:s. Haycock, 32 Ut. 254; 90 Pac. 897, the ap-
pellants' attorney untimely filed a demurrer to the re-
spondent's complaint and, as here, a default was entered. 
Appellant attempted to set aside the default. The Dis-
trict Court refused to vacate the default. The Supreme 
Court reversed and in setting aside the default said: 
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''That the question whether a default and 
judgment should or should not be vacated is one 
to be passed on by the trial court, and that it rests 
within its sound discretion, has so often been 
declared to be the rule of practice that it has be-
come elementary and needs no citation of authori-
ties. It is equally elementary that this discretion 
is to be applied to the facts as they appear in each 
case, and in the exercise of this discretion, the 
aim and object should be the promotion and fur-
therance of justice and the protection of rights of 
all concerned. As has been well said, in all doubt-
ful cases the general rule of courts is to incline 
toward granting relief from the default and to 
bring about a judgment on the merits. (Citing 
Cases) This rule as appears from the authorities, 
is of almost universal application and is defeated 
only in cases where the default is the result of 
inexcusable neglect of the party in default, or 
where it would be inequitable to set it aside ... 
Good faith and reasonable effort to make defense 
are always elements to be considered in each 
case.'' 
" ... Law and courts alike abhor a result that 
condemns a party unheard and unless the law un-
avoidably requires and justice demands it where 
a party has not by his own inexcusable neglect 
deprived himself of the rights, the courts should 
and will, where equity permits, afford relief, to 
the end that a party may be given a hearing." 
InHurd vs. Ford, 74 Ut. 46; 276 Pac. 908, the trial 
court granted the appellants' motion to set aside a de-
fault judgment on condition that the appellant turn over 
certain property in her possession to the sheriff. This 
she refused to do. She appealed from the order of the 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court which denied her motion to vacate the default 
judgment. This court reversed saying: 
'• ... The discretion lodged in the court by this 
statute to set aside a default or to relieve one 
from is to be exercised in the furtherance of jus-
tice. In doubtful cases the courts will incline to-
ward granting relief from defaults to the end that 
a party may have a hearing." 
It is submitted that under the rule of these cases 
excusable neglect was shown in this case and that the 
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant 
appellants' motion. It is shown by the record that the 
stockholders of the Dixon Ranch Company had no actual 
knowledge that a quiet title action was pending concern-
ing the entire assets of the company. It is conceded that 
Arnold Dixon, the sole surviving director was served 
with summons individually and on behalf of the Dixon 
Ranch Company. Conceding without admitting that it 
was proper service upon the corporation, the affidavit 
of Paul Dixon alleges that the elderly Arnold Dixon had 
been very seriously ill for a long time, and that he failed 
to notify any of the other interested members of the 
corporation-the stockholders. The affidavit further 
shows that the stockholders first had knowledge of the 
action by reading publication of summons in a newspaper 
dated the 23rd of August, 1951. The very purpose of 
publication of summons is to give notice of the action 
to interested parties who cannot or have not been served 
with process. The affidavit of attorney Hansen states 
that during a phone conversation with attorney for the 
respondents that respondent's attorney agreed to allow 
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additional time within which the appellants could answer 
the complaint. This oral extension was granted without 
reference to the fact that the default of the Dixon Ranch 
Company had already been entered. 
The answer was filed within one day of the time re-
quired by the published summons and well within the 
time allowed by the oral extension. The striking of the 
answer and enry of default were both done without 
notice. Appellants had procured counsel and had assum-
ed that their rights were being protected. As soon as 
they learned to the contrary they procured new counsel 
who promptly sought relief from the default. 
A more clear case of excusable neglect is presented 
here than in the case cited above where this court granted 
relief because Arnold Dixon was seriously ill he did not 
inform the stockholders of the pending action. In the 
furtherance of justice and the protection of the rights 
of all parties concerned, the stockholders should be al-
lowed to defend the action. It is the stockholders of the 
Dixon Ranch Company who suffer if the default judg-
ment is allowed to stand. They had no knowledge of the 
action because of misfortune and circumstances over 
which they had no control. As soon as they learned of 
the action they took measures to protect themselves. 
Time is of some importance on the question of due 
diligence. Rule 60 (b) U.R.C.P. states that a motion for 
relief under 60 (b) for excusable neglect ''shall be made 
within a reasonable time . , not more than three 
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months nfter the judgment, order or proceeding was 
entered or taken.'' 
One of the standards set forth in the Cutler vs. Hay-
cock case cited above is "good faith and reasonable ef-
forts to make a defense.'' 
After appellants received notice of the Decree on 
October :24th they procured the services of other attor-
neys for the purpose of having the judgment vacated so 
that they could defend the action. On the lOth day of 
November, 1951, the motion to set aside the judgment 
was filed. The date of filing of this motion was well 
within the time limitation of three months as expressed 
in Rule 60 (b) U.R.C.P., and under the circumstances 
is unquestionably within a reasonable time as expressed 
in the same rule. The appellants not only used due 
diligence in the filing of the motion to vacate the judg-
ment, but previous to the entry of judgment they had 
used due diligence to defend the action. 
In the conversation between the attorneys for ap-
pellants and respondent more time had been given in 
which to file an answer if appellants' attorney desired. 
No where does it appear that the attorney for the re-
spondent told the attorney for the appellant that a default 
had already been entered. On the contrary the affidavits 
of Paul Dixon and attorney Hansen state that they had 
no such knowledge. Without knowledge it would be im-
possible for them to take further steps to protect them-
selves. As soon as they became aware of their position 
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they did take steps. The respondent's attorney claims 
that the answer and counterclaim filed by appellants 
was not properly served upon him, but the record shows 
that said answer and counterclaim were stricken upon 
motion of the plaintiff's attorney on the very same day 
that they were filed with the District Court. Proper 
service of the answer if given the day the answer was 
filed would have added nothing to plaintiffs knowledge. 
In its memorandum decision in denying the appel-
lants' motion, the District Court states in substance that 
it is not persuaded that the appellants could successfully 
defend against the claims of title of the respondents. 
This was improper. Such a conclusion was not within 
the province of the trial court upon a hearing of the 
motion to set aside the default judgment. 
Such was this court's holding in the case of Quealy 
vs. vVillardson, 35 Ut. 414; 100 Pac. 930. That case was 
a foreclosure suit in which judgment was taken by de-
fault. The appellant attempted to have the default set 
aside on the grounds of excusable neglect. The District 
Court entertained the view that if it was made to appear 
from the evidence generally that the judgment was right, 
then the judgment should not be vacated regardless of 
whether there was excusable neglect. The case had been 
dormant for six years without an answer being filed. 
The supreme court set aside the default. It said: 
"All that the court could pass on at the hear-
ing on the motion was whether the appellants had 
presented a meritorious defense in their answer, 
and whether they had shown sufficient excuse for 
10 
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not presenting the defense at the proper time. 
\Vith respect to the merits of the defense, the 
appellants had the right to have the court make 
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and enter judgment accordingly, and from such 
judgment they had the right to appeal upon ques-
tions of both law and fact. "\Vhen the court how-
ever, adjudged the defense of the appellants made 
profert as untrue upon the hearing of the motion, 
the right of appeal upon those questions was 
necessarily cut off. It is also true that the courts 
have frequently held that a court will not set aside 
a default judgment when the answer which is 
tendered upon its face shows that the defense is 
unconscionable, dishonest, or purely technical. 
(Citing Cases) A defense may however, seem 
technical, or even unconscionable, upon its face, 
and when all the evidence is heard with respect to 
it may, nevertheless, present a good defense to 
plaintiff's claim. A Court therefore should be 
-..:ery slow in adjudicating in advance of trial what 
defenses are or are not meritorious, or whether 
the judgment entered by default is the only proper 
one in view of all the facts that may be made to 
appear in case a trial upon the merits is had.'' 
'' ... While the courts have the right to require 
all litigants to come into court and to present 
their claims and defenses in accordance with the 
law and rules of procedure, and in case of inex-
cusable neglect to refuse them a hearing, still 
these rules should be enforced so as to reflect 
justice between the parties to the action and for 
the purpose of -..:indicating the law and maintain-
ing the dignity of the court." 
In the lower court the respondents claimed title to 
the property under a tax deed from the County and 
further claimed title upon adverse possession together 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with the payment of taxes. The appellants proposed 
answer and counterclaim to the respondent's claim of 
title under the tax deeds is that the tax deeds are abso-
lutely void because no auditor's affidavit was ever 
issued and therefore the statutory requirements have 
not been met. The appellants' proposed answer and 
counterclaim to the respondent's claim of title by ad-
verse possession is that the respondents have actually 
never been in possession for the statutory period, and 
therefore, could not have acquired title by adverse pos-
session. It is clear that if the appellants could sustain 
their burden upon the trial on these issues they could 
prevail at the trial. It is the trial where such issues 
should be determined, not by affidavit supporting a 
motion to vacate the judgment. Furthermore, if the 
respondents successfully prove title in themselves the 
respondents will not be injured by a trial of the issues. 
It further does not appear that the respondent would be 
injured in any way if the default is set aside. In such a 
case it is an unmistakable abuse of discretion on the 
part of the District Court to deny the appellants' motion 
to set aside the judgment and decree. 
II. REoPENING THE CAsE WouLD NoT BE ONLY FoR THE 
PuRPOSE oF A CRoss-AcTION BETWEEN CERTAIN oF THE 
DEFENDANTs. THE CRoss-AcTION As PERMITTED UNDER 
RuLE 13 (f) U.R.C.P. WouLD BE MERELY INciDENTAL 
To THE IssuEs BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE M~\.IX 
AcTION BuT NEcESSARY TO PREVENT INJUSTICE. 
This District Court partially based its denial of the 
motion to vacate on the grounds that to allow a reopen-
12 
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ing of the case would be only for the purpose of a cross-
action betWl'en the appellants and the Valley Investment 
Company, one of the defendants in the District Court. 
It is absolutely essential that the appellants' claims 
against the Valley InYestment Company be determined 
in this same action. If not, title would be quieted both 
against the appellants and the Valley Investment Com-
pany in this action. A subsequent case between the 
appellants and the Valley Investment Company would 
be moot if both are adjudicated therein to have no 
interest. 
The main purpose the appellants have in defending 
the suit is to preclude the respondents from quieting 
title to the property. For the District Court to determine 
that the only purpose of the suit would be for a cross-
action against another defendant is for the court to 
erroneously and capriciously assume that the appellants 
could not successfully defend the action against the re-
spondents upon a trial of the issues .. For the District 
Court to make such an assumption amounts to its passing 
judgment before trial-contrary to Quealy vs. Willard-
son cited above. 
However, in order to prevail at the trial of the case 
against the respondents, it may be that the appellants 
would first have to have a quit-claim deed from Arnold 
Dixon, sole surviving director of the Dixon Ranch Com-
pany to the Valley Investment Company set aside. In 
this regard, the appellants claim that said deed was 
13 
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obtained by fraud, and further that Arnold Dixon had 
no authority to execute such an instrument, and further 
that he did not have the legal capacity to execute such 
an instrument. 
Rule 1 (a) U.R.C.P. says in part referring to the 
scope of the rules : 
''They shall be liberally construed to secure 
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of 
every action.'' 
To force the appellants to bring a separate action 
against the Valley Investment Company would cause 
unnecessary circuity of action which would certainly not 
be "just, speedy, and inexpensive", if then the appel-
lants had to bring another action against the plaintiff 
who is now before the court, and as stated above, it 
would be a useless proceeding. 
Rule 13 (f) U.R.C.P. would permit such a cross-
action. It provides : 
''A pleading may state as a cross-claim any 
claim by one party against a co-party arising out 
of the original action or of a counter-claim therein 
or relating to any property that is the subject 
matter of the original action. Such cross-claim 
may include a claim that the party against whom 
it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-
claimant for all of part of a claim asserted in the 
action against the cross-claimant.'' 
14 
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SUMMARY 
In conclusion, the record shows facts constituting 
excusable neglect within the meaning of Rule 60 (b) 
U.R.P.C. The facts further show that the appellants 
have prosecuted their rights with due diligence. The 
facts are so strong and unmistakably clear that the 
District Court's denial of the appellant's motion to 
vacate the default judgment was an abuse of its discre-
tion. The motion should be granted, and the appellants 
should be allowed to enter its answer and counterclaim 
and be permitted to defend the action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE & MECHAM 
Attorneys for .Appella;nt 
By Robert C. Gibson 
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